The goals for the U.S. economy in the months ahead are stated most explicitly in the 1973 CEA Report,2 The goals include: a 10 percent advance in GNP from calendar 1972 to 1973 (9 percent from fourth quarter 1972 to fourth quarter 1973); a reduction in the an nual rate of inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, to about 2.5 percent by the end of 1973; and a reduction of unemployment to about 4.5 per cent of the labor force by the end of the year.
Proposed as consistent with the achievement of the 10 percent increase in GNP from 1972 to 1973 is a Federal budget program consisting of an expenditure increase (on a national income accounts basis) of 9.3 percent from calendar 1972 to 1973, and an increase in the average tax rate because of previously legis lated social security tax changes. Though the Admin istration is vague in its recommendation for monetary policy, the CEA does indicate that their target for GNP is likely to require a slower increase of the supply of money and credit than was proper when the main objective was to encourage a quickened economic ex pansion in an environment of substantial unused resources.'1 This article summarizes and evaluates the Admin istration's economic plan. First, as background, last year's plan is compared with the record of achieve ment. Second, the proposed Federal budget program is presented in some detail, along with some discus sion of monetary policy recommendations. Third, the economic plan is evaluated in terms of feasibility and internal consistency. To aid in this evaluation, alter native projections with the St. Louis model are pre sented as a basis for comparison.
ECONOMIC PLAN IN RETROSPECT
In early 1972 the U.S. economy was still in the process of adjusting to the major policy changes which were implemented on August 15, 1971 . At that time, convertibility of the dollar into gold and other reserve assets was suspended, a surcharge was imposed on imports, the Federal excise tax was removed on auto mobiles, and a system of mandatory price-wage con trols was introduced. Then in early 1972, the Admin istration took additional actions which reflected some doubts at that time about the strength of economic expansion. The Administration proposed a stimulative FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1973 fiscal program to be accompanied by an accommoda tive monetary policy.
The following section summarizes the economic record for 1972 and compares that record with the Administration's goals. The record indicates that the Administration's overall goals came very close to be ing realized.
Economic Goals vs. Realizations
The CEA's Report of a year ago projected an in crease in GNP of 9.4 percent from 1971 to 1972. The realized increase was 9.7 percent. This error of 0.3 percent was the smallest for the CEA since 1964 and well below the average absolute error of 1.2 percent for CEA forecasts over the past eleven years.
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A v e r a g e a b s o lu t e e rro r 1 . 2 % ♦Based on data given in the CEA Report for the year following the forecast year. **N o adjustment is made for deviations of policy realizations from plans, or for m ajor strikes.
To further assess the accuracy of the Administra tion's 1972 projection for GNP, an analysis by com ponents is presented in Table II . The CEA displayed uncanny accuracy on the GNP total, but, typically, this accuracy consisted of offsetting errors among the components. Estimates of the increases in personal consumption and Federal purchases were very accur ate, but the increase in fixed investment -that is, busi ness fixed investment plus residential constructionwas underestimated by about $11 billion. This under estimate was largely offset by overestimates of inven tory accumulation, state and local government pur chases, and net exports. The error in projecting in ventory accumulation may have been attributable, in part, to the underestimation of fixed investment. The overestimation of state and local purchases related to the timing of the revenue sharing program, but the T a b le II Projected a n d A c tu a l C h a n g e s in G N P a n d C o m p o n e n ts: 1 97 1 to 1 9 7 2 ( error in estimating net exports was simply a miscal culation of the impact of changes in international economic arrangements in late 1971.
The relatively accurate projection of total GNP car ried through to projections of output, prices and un employment (Table III) . The CEA projected an in crease of 5.9 percent in output, which actually grew at a more rapid 6.5 percent rate. Prices were pro jected to increase 3.2 percent; the actual increase was 3 percent. Unemployment was expected to average 5.6 percent in 1972, declining from 6 percent in late 1971 to about 5 percent late in the year. The actual unemployment rate followed this projected pattern almost perfectly, and did in fact average 5.6 percent for the year.
T a b le III Projected a n d A c tu a l C h a n g e s in In summary, the CEA was very accurate in its prognosis of the course of the major economic aggre gates for 1972. GNP, output, prices, and unemploy ment generally moved in accordance with the CEA targets. The projected change in total GNP was, for practical purposes, realized, but consisted of offsetting errors in the individual components of GNP.
ized and projected values of GNP, output, and prices. A more complete evaluation also takes into account a comparison of policy plans with policy realizations. In other words, was the projection realized because of realized policy plans, or in spite of discrepancies be tween policy plans and realizations? This section compares the record of monetary-fiscal policy actions in 1972 with the original programs and recommendations.
Federal budget plans are compared with realiza tions in Table IV . Examination of NIA receipts and expenditures indicates that there was a substantial underestimate of receipts and a small overestimate of expenditures. The error in both of these estimates worked in the direction of making the realized deficit smaller than projected. Since receipts projections de pend mainly on the forecast of GNP, it is surprising, given the accuracy of the GNP forecast, that the re ceipts estimate was so far off the mark. The reason, of course, was that the CEA did not forecast the ex tent of overwithholding of personal income taxes. Ad justment for this unexpected high flow of receipts indicates that the basic receipts estimate was much closer to realization, though still underestimated. U.S. Treasury estimates of the amount of overwithholding are in the neighborhood of $9 billion, so the economic expansion and its greater-than-expected effect on re ceipts resulted in an error of about $4 billion in the estimate of receipts.4
On the expenditure side, the estimate was quite close, considering the magnitude of the increase which was planned. Furthermore, the error was attrib utable primarily to the delayed enactment of the revenue sharing program.
When the errors for receipts and expenditures are combined, they show that the NIA deficit was over estimated by almost $16 billion. In general, these errors were of the type that suggest that the fiscal stimulus was not nearly as large as originally planned. However, examination of the NIA budget does not reveal the extent to which the budget was reflecting an underestimate of the strength of economic expansion.
To determine more accurately the extent of fiscal stimulus which occurred, the high-employment bud get serves as a more appropriate, though still approxi mate, measure. By this measure, receipts were under estimated by only $4 billion. This error indicates there T a b le IV P la n n e d a n d A c tu a l C h a n g e s in the F e de ral B u dge t: As a result, examination of the change in the highemployment deficit indicates that the fiscal stimulus was about $7 billion less than planned. Despite the stimulus being less than planned, GNP grew slightly faster than projected.
Consider now monetary actions as a part of the overall economic plan for 1972. The Administration did not indicate a specific growth rate for money; however, they did emphasize that monetary policy should be accommodative. Actual money growth was FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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T a b le V Projected C h a n g e s in S p e n d in g , O u tp u t, Prices, a n d U n e m p lo ym e n t: 1971 to 1 9 7 2 U n e m G N P p lo y m e n t ( B il l io n s ) O u t p u t P ric e s R a te C E A P ro je c tio n ( 1 / 2 4 / 7 2 ) $ 9 8 . 2 9 . 4 % 5 . 9 % 3 . 2 % 5 . 6 % A c t u a l 1 0 1 . 7 9 . 7 6 . 5 3 . 0 5 . 6
St. L o u is M o d e l P ro je c t io n s C h a n g e s in m o n e y a n d F e d e r a l s p e n d i n g a s a c t u a lly o c c u rre d 9 0 .1 8 . 6 4 . 6 4.1 5 . 9
C h a n g e s in m o n e y a n d F e d e r a l s p e n d i n g c o n s is t e n t w it h C E A a s s u m p t i o n s o f 1 / 2 4 / 7 2 9 2 . 9 8 .8 4 . 
Analysis Based on St. Louis Model
In general, the CEA projections proved to be very accurate, though the reasons why they were accurate are not clear. For purposes of comparison, some alter native simulations with the St. Louis model were conducted. Such simulations shed little direct light on the CEA projections, yet they provide a systematic basis for evaluating the 1972 economic experience.
Two projections of the St. Louis model are shown in Table V . The first projection uses money and highemployment expenditures as they occurred in 1972. The second projection is the result of using money and high-employment expenditures as recommended in the Administration's economic plan in January 1972.5 The first projection using actual movements of the two key policy variables indicates that, after the fact, the St. Louis model estimated the increase in GNP to be $90.1 billion. The second projection indi cates that movements of the policy variables in line with Administrative recommendations would have in creased GNP by $92.9 billion. Comparison of the pro jections indicates that the total impact of realized 5After the fact, a growth of money at a 7 percent rate was deemed consistent with the CEA forecast for 1972. 
POLICY PLANS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1973
The Administration has projected a 10 percent increase in GNP for 1973. This GNP projection is offered as being consistent with about a 4.7 percent target for unemploy ment for the year (4.5 percent by year end) and a 3 percent rate of inflation for the year (2.5 percent by year end). These projections repre sent a continuation of the progress made in 1972 in reducing both unemployment and inflation.
Though the projections of the broad economic ag gregates are very similar to actual experience in 1972, there are some differences in the composition of GNP (Table VI) . The most notable differences are with reference to business inventories, residential construc tion, net exports, and Federal purchases. Business in ventory accumulation is projected to be much stronger in 1973 than in 1972, while residential construction is expected to slow considerably compared to the very rapid 1972 advance. Net exports are projected to show a smaller deficit, though it should be noted that the CEA projections were released before the U.S. de valued the dollar on February 12. Federal purchases are projected to show little change in 1973, in con trast to the 8 percent increase in 1972.
T a b le V I
Projected C h a n g e s in G N P a n d Com ponents.-1 9 7 2 a n d 
Federal Budget Program for Calendar 1973
The budget plan for calendar 1973 calls for no further fiscal stimulus from calendar 1972. The highemployment budget, as estimated by this Bank, is projected to be in deficit by about $7 billion in calen dar 1973, which compares with a $6 billion deficit in 1972 and a $3 billion surplus in 1971. The budget plan calls for a reduction in this deficit during the year, with an $11 billion annual rate of deficit in the first half and a $4 billion rate of deficit in the second half.
Expenditures -The budget program indicates a $23 billion increase, or 9.3 percent, in Federal expen ditures on an NIA basis for calendar 1973 (Table  V II ). This compares with an 11.8 percent advance in 1972 and a 6.8 percent average rate of increase from 1968 to 1971.
Defense spending is projected to decline in 1973 by 1.8 percent, compared to a 6.7 percent increase in 1972. However, defense spending is projected to ad vance 1.1 percent from the second half of 1972 to the second half of 1973. The effect of cessation of Vietnam hostilities has already occurred as defense spending declined at a 3 percent average annual rate from 1968 to 1971, after increasing at a 16 percent average rate from 1965 to 1968.
Nondefense spending, according to the Adminis tration's budget, is projected to advance 14.2 percent in 1973, the same rate of increase as in 1972, and in line with the 13 percent average rate of increase from 1965 to 1971. As with defense spending, year-to-year comparisons are misleading, because nondefense spending is projected to increase at a 2 percent an nual rate from the first half 1973 to the second half of 1973. Nondefense spending in the first half of 1973 reflects the temporary effects of retroactive revenue sharing, the continuing effects of a permanent in crease in social security benefits, and a $2.2 billion pay increase for government employees.
Receipts -Federal receipts on an NIA basis are projected to rise by $19 billion in 1973, or by 8.4 per cent. By comparison, receipts rose by 15 percent in 1972. These year-to-year comparisons are influenced in considerable measure by the effects of the over withholding of personal income taxes in 1972.
To identify more precisely the basic trends for re ceipts, the sources of change are shown in Table VII . The only major tax change is the increase in the social security tax rate from 10.4 to 11.7 percent, effective January 1, 1973, and the expansion of the base for social security taxes from $9,000 to $10,800. The rise Surplus/deficit position -The combined effect of rising expenditures and receipts is a slight increase in the NIA deficit by $4 billion, from $18.5 billion in 1972 to $22.5 billion in 1973. However, since the NIA budget is influenced by the projected pace of eco- nomic activity, a more accurate indication of the eco nomic impact of the budget can be obtained by ex amining the high-employment budget. Even on this basis, the estimate of the economic impact of the budget program is very approximate.
On a high-employment basis, the NIA budget is projected to be in deficit by $7 billion in 1973. The plan of the Administration is to have the high-em ployment budget moving toward a surplus position by early 1974. This plan is predicated on the assump tion that inflationary pressures will be developing in 1973 and a movement in the direction of fiscal re straint will be necessary to combat these pressures. This budget strategy stands in marked contrast to 1972 when a large fiscal stimulus was planned to ac celerate economic expansion.
Monetary Policy Recommendations
The Administration's overall economic plan is fo cused on the Federal budget, with very little mention of the role for monetary actions. The Economic Re port of the President, for example, makes no men tion of monetary policy. Furthermore, the 1973 CEA Report, in contrast to recent past reports, placed little emphasis on monetary actions, either with reference to their role in the 1972 expansion or in terms of recommendations for 1973. Monetary actions in 1972 were summarized simply as "accommodating" with respect to the financial requirements of last year's expansion.
The role for monetary policy in 1973 is summarized by the CEA as follows:
A gradual slowing of the expansion of money GNP to a steady rate consistent with the long-run poten tial growth rate of the economy and reasonable price stability is also an appropriate goal for monetary policy. This is likely to require a slower increase of the supply of money and credit. . . ,6
EVALUATION OF 1973 ECONOMIC PLAN
The Administration's projection for 1973 is very close to the consensus of other forecasts. For purposes of comparison, the CEA projections are evaluated with reference to the St. Louis model. This section focuses on two considerations: (1) Is the projected increase in total spending consistent with the pro posed set of stabilization policies, and (2) are the price and unemployment goals consistent with the projected increase in total spending? *1973 CEA Report, p. 75. 
Feasibility of Total Spending Goal
To determine the feasibility of the Administration's projection of a $115 billion, or 10 percent, increase in GNP, two combinations of policies were conducted with the St. Louis model. These combinations of policies are:
(1) increases of Federal spending as proposed in the budget and an expansion of money at a steady 6 percent annual rate from fourth quar ter 1972;* (2) increases of Federal spending as proposed in the budget and an expansion of money at a steady 8 percent annual rate from fourth quarter 1972.
The two alternatives for money growth represent two illustrative courses of monetary action. It should be emphasized that they are illustrative and in no way directly attributable to the CEA or the Federal Reserve System. The steady 6 percent path of money growth is presented as being consistent with the rec ommendation of the CEA, at least in direction if not 7The assumed path for Federal spending reflects special con siderations which are necessary to assess the economic impact of fiscal actions within the framework of the St. Louis model.
The impact of fiscal actions on GNP in the St. Louis model works only through a direct effect on GNP. As a result, large variations in Federal expenditures tend to introduce distor tions in the results because the sample period used for esti mation of the coefficients is relatively free of such variations.
And even to the extent such variations are evident in past experience, the process of estimating regression coefficients is itself an averaging process. More specifically, the rise in ex penditures in the fourth quarter of 1972 was attributable in large measure to retroactive revenue sharing. Information re lating to the special nature of this expenditure increase was used to introduce a judgmental element into the model inputs so as to reduce distortions in the outputs of the model.
Page 7
Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS

MARCH 1973
T a b le V I I I Projected C h a n g e s in To tal G N P : 1 9 7 3 a n d 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 B illio n s In c r e a s e B ill io n s In c r e a s e C E A P ro je c tio n ( 1 / 3 1 / 7 3 ) $ 1 1 4 . 9 1 0 . 0 % $ --% St. L o u is M o d e l P ro je c tio n 1 ) W it h 6 p e rc e n t m o n e y g r o w t h a n d F e d e r a l s p e n d i n g b a s e d o n fis c a l 1 9 7 4 b u d g e t 1 1 1 . 9 9 . 7 8 5 . 3 6 . 8
2 ) W it h 8 p e rc e n t m o n e y g r o w t h a n d F e d e r a l s p e n d i n g b a s e d o n fisc a l 1 9 7 4 b u d g e t 1 1 9 . 2 1 0 . 3 1 0 8 . 8 8 . 6
in precise magnitude. The steady 8 percent money path would represent an approximate continuation of the course of monetary actions in 1972.
The results for these combinations of policies are shown in Table VIII . The combination of a steady 6 percent growth of money and government spending based on the fiscal 1974 budget yields results which are roughly consistent with the CEA projections. The conclusion is offered here that the CEA projection is indeed feasible if the impact of retroactive revenue sharing is distributed more evenly over time than the NIA expenditure estimates would indicate.
The case with steady 8 percent money growth is shown for illustration. If money should grow at a rapid 8 percent rate, the St. Louis model indicates that GNP would increase by about $5 billion more than the CEA forecasts. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the St. Louis model contains an implicit assumption that velocity will grow at a rela tively slow rate in the range of 2.2 to 2.8 percent from 1972 to 1973.
In summary, the CEA projection appears to be feasible and realistic. There is a definite possibility, however, that the expansion of nominal GNP will be stronger than planned if (1) money grows faster than at a 6 percent rate, (2) velocity increases more rap idly, or (3) some combination of the two.
Implications of Total Spending Goal
Aside from the possibility of attaining the GNP goal, attention is now focused on the Administration's price and unemployment goals. Table IX, on the fol lowing page, shows the implied paths of output, prices and unemployment as given by the St. Louis model using an estimated path for GNP consistent with the CEA forecast. There are two St. Louis model projec-longer-run effects of the price-wage control program.
Examination of the table indicates the critical im portance of the assumption about the success of Phase III of the price-wage control program, as well as the lasting effects of the earlier phases of the program. The two alternatives reflect assumptions about these lasting effects. The first St. Louis model projection assumes that past controls were effective in permanendy reducing the price level from what it otherwise would have been, and that the 1973 price-unemploy ment mix will be determined within that context. The other alternative assumes that price-wage controls were not effective in permanently reducing the price level, and prices will thus show a catch-up effect toward the basic trend as determined by monetaryfiscal actions during the period of controls.
Examination of these alternatives indicates that the Administration's forecast is roughly consistent with the "effectiveness of controls" version of the St. Louis model. With this version of the model, prices are pro jected to rise 3.3 percent in 1973, only slightly higher than that projected by the CEA. Unemployment is projected to average 4.7 percent, about the same as the Administration's projection.
Consider now the "ineffectiveness of controls" ver sion of the St. Louis model. This model shows a rapid run-up in prices in 1973, which illustrates the assump tion that prices will reflect a level consistent with the longer-run path of monetary growth. In other words, the assumption underlying this version of the model is that it is not possible to control prices by fiat over the
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T a b le I X Projected C h a n g e s in G N P , O u tp u t i , Prices, a n d U n e m p lo ym e n t: 1 9 7 3 a n d 1 9 7 4 ( P e r c e n t) ( 1 ) W it h C E A G N P a n d c o n t r o ls e ffe c tiv e n e ss G N P 1 0 . ( 2 ) W it h C E A G N P a n d c o n t r o ls in e ffe c t iv e n e s s G N P 1 0 . longer rim. This particular version of the model as sumes that this catch-up process will take two years, though this is an arbitrary assumption. Given this ver sion of the model and its assumptions, the outlook for employment is somewhat less optimistic, showing an average unemployment rate of 4.9 percent for 1973.
Any conclusions about the attainability of the Ad ministration's price-unemployment goals are very ten tative. In particular, it still remains to be determined whether the price-wage control program has had any lasting effects on price trends. Aside from such shortrun considerations, it is perhaps more certain that monetary-fiscal actions over the next two years are crucial in the determination of price trends beyond 1974. An awareness of these longer-run considerations is demonstrated in the CEA Report, however, when they suggest the urgency of getting the economy on a noninflationary growth path.
SUMMARY
The Administration has projected another year of rapid growth in GNP. Accompanying this rapid growth is a belief that unemployment will be reduced further and inflation will continue to slow. Over the longer run the CEA has made it clear that it seeks the objective of slowing the pace of economic advance so as to be consistent with noninflationary growth.
To achieve their objectives, the Administration pro poses a Federal budget program that maintains a stimulative posture in 1973, but with the degree of stimulus moderating during the year. At the same time, the Administration recommends a slowing in monetary growth from the rapid 7.4 percent advance in 1972.
Using the St. Louis model as an aid in evaluating the 1973 economic plan, it was found that the total spending goal was feasible. This goal for total spend ing leaves little margin for error, however, for any one or a combination of several eventualities could push GNP above the Administration's goals. The GNP goal requires that money growth does not exceed 6 percent, that Federal spending rises in line with pro jections, and that the income velocity of money in creases at a rate of about 3 percent. To the extent that the income velocity of money rises at a more rapid rate, the growth of the money stock would have to be correspondingly slower.
Assessment of the Administration's goals for prices and unemployment is much more difficult. Due to the uncertainty that still exists as to the lasting effects of the price-wage control program, as it has been ad ministered up to this time, achievement of these goals is much more tenuous. A version of the St. Louis model, which builds in the assumption of past suc cess of price-wage controls, indicates that the Admin istration's price-unemployment goals are attainable in 1973, given their assumptions about monetary-fiscal actions. But any tendency towards a catching-up of prices will delay the attainment of either the price or the unemployment goal.
FOMC Policy Actions in 1972
by JERRY L. JORDAN _L HE PRIMARY policy objective of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in early 1972 was to provide sufficient monetary growth to facilitate con tinued real economic expansion in an environment in which administrative controls on prices and wages had been imposed. Late in 1972 the directive of the Fed eral Open Market Committee specified slower growth of monetary aggregates as the policy discussions in dicated an increasing concern for the possibilities of re-emergence of inflationary pressures.1
This review of policy actions of the FOMC in 1972 will include little reference to the "New Economic Program." No one, including members of the FOMC, would be able to say for certain how, or even whether, monetary policy decisions would have been different last year if underlying economic conditions had been the same but there had been no price-wage control program.
The primary source of information for this article is the "Record of Policy Actions" of the Federal Open Market Committee.-These "Records" of policy ac tions contain little reference to the Government's con trol program. Consequently, there is no explicit indi cation of the extent to which the various aspects of the Administration's program served as either a con straint on, or as an inducement to, FOMC actions. 
PROVIDING SUFFICIENT STIMULUS -EARLY 1972
The "policy consensus" and "operating instructions" at the first meeting of 1972 were unchanged from the December 1971 meeting.3 In fact, the policy consen sus in January 1972 was identical to that of the last five meetings in 1971, all following the August 15 an nouncement of the New Economic Program. Specific ally, the policy of the FOMC was to "foster financial conditions consistent with the aims of the new gov ernmental program. . . ." These aims were said to in clude "sustainable real economic growth and increased employment, abatement of inflationary pressures, and attainment of reasonable equilibrium in the country's balance of payments."
Although the actions necessary to achieve each of these goals would involve some conflict if pursued simultaneously and equally, the operating instructions provide some indication of the weight given by the Committee to these goals. In November 1971 the Committee's instructions had indicated a desire to "promote somewhat greater growth in monetary and credit aggregates," while at the December 1971 meet ing this seems to have become a more definite objec tive as the Committee sought to "promote the degree of ease in bank reserve and money market condi tions essential to greater growth in monetary aggregates. . . ."4 ■^Throughout this article these terms refer, respectively, to the last two sentences in the directive. See Exhibit I for further reference to these terms. 7 -7 1 8 -7 1 9 -7 1 1 0 -7 1 1 1 -7 1 1 2 -7 1 1 -7 2 2 -7 2 3 -7 2 4 -7 2 5 -7 2 4 -7 2 7 -7 2 8 -7 2 9 -7 2 1 0 -7 2 1 1 -7 2 1 2 -7 2 i -7 3 D O L L A R S * T -71 8 -7 1 9 -7 1 1 0 -7 1 1 1 -7 1 1 2 -7 1 1 -7 2 2 -7 2 3 -7 2 4 -7 2 5 -7 2 6 -7 2 7 -7 2 8 -7 2 9 -7 2 1 0 -7 2 1 1 -7 2 1 2 - 7 7 -7 1 8 -7 1 9 -7 1 1 0 -7 1 1 1 -7 1 1 2 -7 1 1 -7 2 2 -7 2 3 -7 2 4 -7 2 5 -7 2 6 -7 2 7 -7 2 8 -7 2 9 -7 2 1 0 -7 2 1 1 -7 2 1 2 -7 2 1 -7 3 D O LL A R S 8 -7 i 2 . 6 2 3 4 . 6 9 -7 1 2 . 1 1 . 5 2 3 4 . 9 1 0 -7 1 2 . 8 2 . 8 4 . 2 2 3 5 . 7 1 1 -7 1 1 . 9 1 . 7 1 . 8 -0 . 5 2 3 5 . 6 1 2 -7 1 2 . 0 1 . 8 1 .9 0 . 8 2 . 1 2 3 6 . 0 1 -7 2 1 . 8 1 . 6 1 . 7 0 . 9 1 . 5 1 . 0 2 3 6 . 2 2 -7 2 3 . 7 3 . 9 4 . 3 4 . 4 6 . 1 8 . 1 1 5 . 8 2 3 9 . 1 3 -7 2 4 . 7 5 . 0 5 . 6 5 . 9 7 . 6 9 . 5 1 4 . 0 1 2 . 1 1 -7 2 5 . 9 6 . 1 6 . 5 6 . 6 7 . 3 7 . 7 8 . 4 7 . 7 7 . 1 6. 9 7 . 4 7 . 6 6 . 2 6 . 8 6 . 4 5 . 4 2 5 2 . 7 1 2 -7 2 6 . 4 6 . 6 7 . 0 7 . 2 7 . 8 8 . 3 8 . 9 8 . 3 7 . 9 7. 9 8 . 4 8 . 7 7 . 7 8 . 6 8 . 9 9 . 7 1 4 .1 2 5 5 . 5 1 -7 3 6 . 0 6 . 2 6 . 5 6 . 6 7 . 2 7 . 6 8 .1 7 . 5 7 . 0 6. 9 7 . 2 7 . 3 6 . 3 6 . 7 6 . 5 6 . 2 6 . 6 -0 . 5 2 5 5 . 4 2 -7 3 6 . 0 6 . 2 6 . 5 6 . 6 7 . 1 7 . 5 8 . 0 7 . 4 6 . 9 6 . 8 7 . 1 7 . 2 6 . 3 6 . 6 6 . 5 6 . 2 6 . 5 2 . 9 6 . 3 2 5 6 . 7 7 -7 1 8 -7 1 9 -7 1 1 0 -7 1 1 1 -7 1 1 2 -7 1 1 -7 2 2 -7 2 3 -7 2 4 -7 2 5 -7 2 6 -7 2 7 -7 2 8 -7 2 9 -7 2 1 0 -7 2 1 1 -7 2 1 2 -7 2 1 -7 3
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This wording, which was repeated at the January 1972 meeting, indicates that at that time, with the existence of a price-wage control program, the Com mittee gave greater weight to providing the growth of money and credit which they viewed as essential to real economic recovery. A review of operating instruc tions issued in 1971 shows that for several months prior to the imposition of the price-wage freeze, the FOMC desired to slow the growth in monetary aggregates from the very high rates of the first half of the year. At the September and October 1971 meetings the Committee had agreed to seek "to achieve moderate growth in monetary and credit aggregates. . . How ever, by November, after a few months of slower growth, the consensus had moved to one of desiring more rapid growth.
This qualitative phrasing of the growth rates of monetary aggregates sought by the policymakers is characteristic of the "Record of Policy Actions" of each meeting in 1972. Thus, the reader has only a general impression of the rates of growth that would be satisfactory to the Committee. At previous meet ings, mostly from February 1970 to May 1971, the directive indicated specific growth rates of the money supply or other monetary aggregates that were being sought. This practice was not followed in the secondhalf of 1971. Then, at the January 1972 meeting, the "Record" began to report an objective of the Com mittee in terms of a specific range for the rate of growth of a measure of bank reserves. Specified at each subsequent meeting was a "target" growth rate of reserves which was deemed consistent with the Committee's desired growth rates for monetary ag gregates. However, the rates of monetary aggregates were not specified, and because of the possibility of anticipated changes in the reserve-money multiplier, one cannot assume that a change in the target growth rate of the reserve aggregate would be accompanied by a similar change in the desired growth of the money supply and other monetary aggregates.5
The policy consensus and the operating instructions included in the economic policy directive issued at the January 1972 meeting contained essentially the same wording as a month earlier. However, by this time there were apparently significant differences in the views of some members of the Committee. The policy directive had been adopted unanimously at the De cember 1971 meeting, but in January three votes were cast against the directive. The reasons given for the dissents reveal some of the differences concerning the implementation of pol icy. The text of the "Record of Policy Actions" for the January meeting summarizes the majority view:
In the Committee's discussion considerable con cern was expressed about the persistent sluggishness of key monetary aggregates, and a number of mem bers advocated action to provide sufficient reserves to support the faster monetary growth that they believed was required by the economic situation and outlook. It was noted in this connection that the level of member bank reserves, as well as that of M i, had changed little during the fourth quarter de spite a progressive easing of money market condi tions. In the interest of assuring the provision of reserves needed for adequate growth in monetary aggregates, the Committee decided that in the pe riod until its next meeting open market operations, while continuing to take appropriate account of conditions in the money market, should be guided more by the course of total reserves than had been customary in the past ....
In placing greater emphasis on total reserves, the Committee took note of a staff analysis suggesting that moderate rates of growth in Mi and M2 in January and February were likely to be associated with a large increase in total reserves from December to January and then a decline in February -mainly as a consequence of recent and anticipated changes in U.S. Government deposits, and allowing for the 2-week lag between member bank deposits and re quired reserves. Against the background of this analysis, a majority agreed that an annual rate of growth in total reserves of roughly 20 to 2 5 per cent from December to January would be satisfactory, provided that it could be attained without undue easing of money market conditions. Following the directive, the "Record" notes:
Messrs. Hayes, Brimmer, and Kimbrel differed somewhat in their reasons for dissenting from this action. Mr. Hayes considered the emphasis placed on total reserves as an operating target to be an undesirable step; in his judgment, reserves were much less meaningful than other measures, such as the monetary and credit aggregates and interest rates, as an instrument for working toward the Commit tee's basic economic objectives. Also, he was reluc tant to issue a directive that might involve a sub stantial further easing of money market conditions, since the Committee had already moved rapidly in that direction and since it appeared to him that the economic outlook had improved somewhat in recent months. H e was concerned about the risk that a further sharp decline in short-term interest rates might subject financial markets to unnecessary whipsawing and might tend to rekindle inflationary expectations.
Mr. Brimmer shared the majority's views concern ing broad objectives of policy a t this time, and he
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®The range of tolerance fo r the R PD growth rate was modified to 9 to 14 percent due to the amendments to Regulations D and J . indicated that he would have voted favorably on the directive were it not for the decision to give special emphasis to total reserves as an operating target dur ing coming weeks. In his judgment the Committee should have had more discussion of the implications of that decision, and in any case it should have postponed the decision until after it had held a con templated meeting to be devoted primarily to dis cussion of its general procedures with respect to operating targets.
Mr. Kimbrel favored supplying reserves at a rate that would accommodate orderly economic expan sion. H e voted against the directive because he thought it involved risks of depressing short-term in terest rates to unsustainably low levels and of pro ducing excessive rates of growth in the monetary aggregates in the future.
MODERATE GROWTH OF AGGREGATES -FERRUARY AND MARCH
When the Committee met again in February it established a policy consensus which was similar to those adopted during the previous six months. The essential difference was deletion of reference to "the aims of the new governmental program. . . ." Through out the remainder of the year there was no change in the policy consensus.
The operating instruction included in the directive issued at the February meeting was less expansive in tone than the previous two. As intended, a large growth in bank reserves had occurred between the January and February meetings, and the desired ac celeration in the growth of monetary aggregates had begun. Consequently, the Committee decided to seek conditions that would "support moderate growth in monetary aggregates. . . ."
To achieve its near-term objectives, the Commit tee modified further the operating target. The use of total bank reserves had been adopted only a month earlier, but at the February meeting . . . the Committee decided to express its reserve objectives in terms of reserves available to support private nonbank deposits [RPDs] -defined specifi cally as total member bank reserves less those re quired to support Government and interbank depos its. This measure was considered preferable to total reserves because short-run fluctuations in Govern ment and interbank deposits are sometimes large and difficult to predict and usually are not of major significance for policy. It was deemed appropriate for System open market operations normally to ac commodate such changes in Government and inter bank deposits.
The Committee agreed that the economic situation and outlook at this time called for growth in the Page 16
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monetary aggregates at moderate rates. It took note of a staff analysis suggesting that, over the months of February and M arch combined, such growth was likely to be associated with expansion in the reserve measure employed at about an 8 per cent annual rate, and possibly with some firming of money mar ket conditions. The members decided that it would be desirable to seek growth in the reserve measure in the February-M arch period at an annual rate in a range of 6 to 10 per cent, while avoiding both sharp short-run fluctuations and undesirably large cumula tive changes in money market conditions in either direction in the period between meetings. They also decided that some allowance should be made in the conduct of operations for any significant deviations that might develop between the actual rates of growth in the monetary aggregates and the moderate growth rates expected.
Mr. Hayes dissented from this action . . . for essentially the same reasons he had dis sented from the directive adopted at the previous meeting. First, he did not favor placing as much emphasis as contemplated on reserves as an operat ing target; he preferred to place main emphasis on money market conditions for that purpose. Second, he thought the policy agreed upon could result in an easing of money market conditions to a degree that in his judgment would entail substantial risks both domestically and internationally.
Another new element at the February meeting was introduced: . . . it was understood that the Chairman might call upon the Committee to consider the need for sup plementary instructions if it appeared during the period before the next scheduled meeting that the Committee's several objectives and constraints were not being m et satisfactorily.
The understanding was repeated in the "Record of Policy Actions" for each of the subsequent meetings through the remainder of 1972.
Some perspective on a prominent view of the role of monetary policy early last year might be gained from reference to Chairman Bums' testimony on Feb ruary 9, 1972 before the Joint Economic Committee. Regarding monetary developments, the Chairman noted . . . the role that monetary policy needs to play in furthering national objectives this year. Clearly, our monetary affairs -no less than our fiscal affairsmust be kept in order, so that public confidence in our monetary management is maintained. An unduly expansive monetary policy would be most unfortun ate, particularly in view of the large Federal budg etary deficits now projected. W e need always to be mindful of the fact that increases in money and credit achieved today will still be with us tomorrow, when economic conditions may no longer be the same as they are today.
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with more emphasis on increasing the reserve base of the banking system. In the 5 months from Septem ber through January, total bank reserves rose at an annual rate of over 8 per cent. Thus far, much of this increase has supported an accelerated growth in time deposits. But, in due course, the narrowly de fined money stock, on which so much emphasis is nowadays placed by some single-minded observers, will also respond; preliminary calculations indicate that this aggregate rose more rapidly in January than in the immediately preceding months. [Ibid, p. 127.] For the meeting on March 21 the "Record" notes the fact that yields on short-term market securities had risen considerably in recent weeks. This was a largely expected development following the very sharp declines in short-term rates that had occurred in late 1971 and the first few weeks of 1972. It was pointed out in the "Record" that the spread between rates on short-and long-term securities had been ex tremely wide by historical standards, and it remained wide even after the recent rise in short-term rates. The staff analysis indicated that a moderate growth in monetary aggregates during March and April com bined would likely be associated with an 11 percent rate of growth in RPDs and some further tightening in money market conditions. As cited above, the Committee directives for De cember 1971 and January 1972 had called for greater growth in the monetary aggregates over the months ahead. In order to achieve this greater growth, a ma jority of the Committee at the January meeting had voted to increase total bank reserves at a 20-25 per cent annual rate from December to January. This effort was clearly successful by the March meeting where . . . it appeared that over the first quarter Mi and M2 would expand at annual rates of about 9 .5 and 13.0 per cent, respectively, and that the bank credit proxy would rise at a rate of about 10.5 per cent.6
However, regarding this increase, it was noted that M1 "increased sharply in February -in part because of a substantial reduction in U. S. Government de posits at commercial banks."
The growth of the narrowly defined money stock accelerated to a 9.6 percent annual rate in the period from December 1971 to March 1972, compared with a 1.1 percent rate of increase in the previous three months. Staff projections at the March meeting sug-6Quarterly growth rates cited are calculated on the basis of the daily-average level in the last month of the quarter relative to the last month of the preceding quarter.
gested a somewhat faster growth in real GNP in the second quarter than in the first, and the Committee agreed that the . . . economic situation continued to call for moderate growth in the monetary aggregates, although at rates less rapid than those likely to be recorded for the first quarter.
SEEKING SLOWER MONEY GROWTH -APRIL AND MAY
According to the "Record" for the Committee meet ing in mid-April, the economic oudook at that time appeared almost the same as a month earlier. In view of the projections of a continually strengthening eco nomy in 1972, the monetary authorities indicated a desire to avoid providing excessive stimulus. At the April meeting
The Committee agreed that the economic situa tion called for growth in the monetary aggregates at rates somewhat more moderate than those recorded for the first quarter of the year.
When the Committee met again five weeks later they "agreed that the economic situation called for growth in the monetary aggregates over the months ahead at rates somewhat slower than those recorded in recent months." However, to achieve this objective, after taking account of lagged reserve requirements and recent changes in deposits, the Committee speci fied a range of growth in RPDs that was slightly higher than the range indicated at the previous meeting, and R e se rv e s A v a i l a b l e to S u p p o rt P riva te N o n b a n k D e p o s its Operating Target and Actual Growth Li Percent Percent the lower end of which was the same as recent experi ence. Thus, at the April meeting they had specified a range of RPD growth of 7 to 11 percent, and at the time of the May meeting it appeared their actions had resulted in growth of these reserves at a 7.5 percent rate. The consensus was to seek a somewhat slower rate of growth in monetary aggregates; the range of RPD growth for the May-June period was specified to be 7.5 to 11.5 percent.
ACHIEVING MODERATE GROWTH-JUNE TO AUGUST
A month later it appeared that growth of RPDs in the May-June period would be at the lower end of the specified range, and growth of the narrowly de fined money stock had slowed further. The Commit tee lowered its desired target range of RPD growth to 4.5 to 8.5 percent during the June-July period. As usual, "the members also decided that some allowance should be made in the conduct of operations if growth in the monetary aggregates appeared to be deviating significantly from the rates expected. . . ."
The provision for a change in the conduct of op erations under certain conditions would appear to have become of some importance in view of the events around mid-year. The decisions and actions of the preceding few months had been in the direction of less rapid growth of monetary aggregates than had occurred early in the year. The operating instructions of the April and May meetings had called for "some what more moderate growth" and "somewhat slower growth" in mone tary aggregates over the months ahead, respectively. At the June meet ing the desired range of RPD growth had been significantly reduced. Appar ently, though, the results were differ ent than expected. The "Record" for the July meeting, after noting that the growth of Mj in June was at the same relatively slow rate of May, stated: Sluggishness in June, however, may have reflected temporary effects of the speculation in foreign exchange markets and outflows of funds from the United States after mid-month, and weekly data suggested a sharp increase in the rate of expansion in early July.
The idea underlying the reference to "outflows of funds from the United States" is complex. During such an "outflow" there is a change in ownership of demand deposit accounts at U. S. commercial banks, wherein deposits of domestic holders are reduced (initially and temporarily) and holdings of foreigners (in dividuals, governments, banks, or other firms) are increased. Since the U. S. money stock is defined to include deposits of foreigners, a change of ownership of demand deposits from U. S. residents to foreigners does not influence the quantity of money outstanding unless government deposits are also changed.
The reference to "a sharp increase in the rate of expansion in early July" is another matter. Mid-year "window-dressing" by commercial banks, and the oc currence of the July 4 holiday on Tuesday of the same settlement week, may have contributed to an unusually large increase in net demand deposits at member banks in the first week of July.7 Similar tem porary fluctuations have occurred on other occasions, and over the subsequent few weeks the growth of the money supply returned to its previous trend. How ever, instead of an offsetting drop in demand deposits following the mid-year bulge, the level of deposits plateaued at the high level. The growth rate of money for the month of July was at a 15 percent annual rate, and in August the growth rate of money was reduced to only a 5.7 percent rate.8 7For nonbusiness days, banks use the balance of the preceding business day. During the week ending July 5, banks carried the large June 30 balances for three days, resulting in a large increase in the weekly average net demand deposits. sThe "revised" money stock series shows an increase in money from June to July at a 13.5 percent rate, and an increase at a 4.4 percent rate from July to August.
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This episode may illustrate some of the problems associated with short-run monetary management, espe cially under a system of lagged reserve requirements. The deposits of banks in any given week are relatively independent of the amount of reserves in the banking system that week, but the Federal Reserve is obliged to provide reserves -either through open market op erations or through the discount window -to meet the requirements based on the deposits of two weeks earlier.
The operating instructions issued at the July 18 meeting were the same as had been issued at the June meeting, namely "the Committee seeks to achieve bank reserve and money market conditions that will support moderate growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead." Mr. Coldwell dissented from this action . . . because in his judgment average growth in bank reserves within the specified range for July and August and the associated expansion in the money supply might build a base for excessive economic stimulation. He was concerned about the effects both on the domestic economic situation, in the context of heavy stimulation from fiscal policy, and on in ternational financial problems.
The "Record" for the August 15 meeting noted the very rapid growth of the money stock in July, but no reason for the sharp rise was reported. The report to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress regarding the "Financial Developments in the Third Quarter of 1972" states, "Over the third quarter, M, grew at an 8.5 percent annual rate, but this mainly reflected in creased public demand for cash balances early in JuZt/."9 [emphasis added]
In view of the then current rapid growth of aggre gates, the "Record" reports that following the July meeting "the System undertook to slow the increase in reserves to the extent feasible in light of the largescale Treasury refunding then in process." While con tinuing to desire to hold down monetary growth in the coming period, an increased concern about inter est rate movements was expressed:
The Committee agreed that the economic situation continued to call for moderate growth in the mone tary aggregates over the months ahead. It decided to seek growth in RPD's during the August-September period at an annual rate in a range of 5 to 9 per cent -a rate which was expected to be associated with some moderation in monetary growth. While recognizing that pursuit of the objective for RPD 's In commenting on the rapid growth of RPDs in the third quarter, the report to the Joint Economic Com mittee emphasizes the different avenues through which the Federal Reserve provides reserves to the banking system. The report notes that "reserves pro vided through open market operations were held back and more than half of the increased demand for re serves was obtained by banks through enlarged bor rowing from Reserve Bank discount windows."10 Dur ing that period short-term market interest rates tended to rise, with relatively sharp increases occurring in the second half of the quarter. Prior to August the Federal funds rate (the rate at which banks borrow reserves from each other) had been mostly below the Federal Reserve Banks' discount rate. Since that time the funds rate has generally been rising relative to the discount rate, making borrowing from Federal Reserve banks a relatively cheaper source of short term funds to banks. The accompanying chart shows the movement of short-term interest rates in this period. 
Monetary Base and Federal Reserve Credit
SLOWING THE GROWTH OF MONEY -SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER
At the final meeting of the quarter, the economic outlook was for an even stronger growth of GNP in the fourth quarter than in the third. GNP growth was seen to remain at a fast pace in the first half of 1973. Analysis prepared for the September meeting included discussion of the factors contributing to sharp increases in short-term market interest rates in the pe riod between meetings. The Committee's target from the previous meeting was for growth of RPDs be tween 5 and 9 percent "subject to the proviso that money market conditions should not be permitted to firm markedly."
Pursuit of the RPD target was complicated by the need to absorb reserves at a time when the market supply of Treasury bills was increasing. Early in the period, R PD 's -and the monetary aggregates -ap peared to be expanding rapidly. As the System acted to restrain growth in reserves, short-term interest rates began to rise sharply and financial markets became increasingly sensitive; this was especially evident just before the Labor Day weekend when a number of banks misjudged their reserve needs and bid the Federal funds rate up as high as 5V2 per cent. In order to avoid a marked firming in money market conditions and unduly sharp increases in interest rates, for a time the System supplied reserves more generously.
For the coming months the Committee desired to slow the growth in monetary aggregates from the rates of the third quarter; however, "the members noted that conditions in financial markets were still highly sensitive." Because of this condition and the possibility of regulatory changes, the members de cided that in seeking an annual rate of RPD growth in a 9.5 to 13.5 percent range . . . the System Account Manager should have more than the usual degree of discretion in making operat ing decisions and that he should give more than customary attention to money market conditions, while continuing to avoid marked changes in such conditions. There were two dissents from this directive, both based on concern about the rapid monetary growth.
Mr. M acLaury dissented from this action because he had become increasingly disturbed by the rapid rates of growth in the aggregates, given the prospec tive strength of the economy, and he felt that the Committee's current operating procedures did not assure that money market conditions would be per mitted to tighten sufficiently to slow this excessive monetary growth in the near future.
Mr. Robertson dissented because of his belief that with the existing potentiality for increased inflation ary pressures, the Committee was not doing enough to curb the rate at which reserves were being fed into the banking system by the Federal Reserve and to slow down the rate of growth in the mone tary aggregates. In his view, the failure to do so might result in a new ground swell of inflation later on.
At the final three meetings of 1972, the Committee made explicit in its operating instructions that lower growth rates of monetary aggregates were being sought. The operating target adopted at the meeting of September 19 was for growth of RPDs in the range of 9.5 to 13.5 percent for the September-October pe riod, "unless disturbances arose in financial markets or unless growth rates in the monetary aggregates appeared to be falling far short of expectations." At the October meeting RPD growth appeared to be at the lower end of the range, and it was noted:
